Project challenges / verified progress
Beacon: package it so anyone can run it

The engineering notebook

Prove who built it

How can someone verify the image came from your workflow?

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Phase 3 — Publish, inspect, prove

Step 01 of 06

Understand the idea

A digest identifies the exact contents of an image. It does not tell you who built the image. In this lesson, you will sign an image and verify the signature to check who produced it.

DIGEST TO TRUSTED CLAIM01Image digestcontent identitysha25602OIDC identityGitLab CI jobshort lived03Cosign signsignature objectattached04Rekor logpublic recordauditable05Verifyidentity plus bytespolicy
Signing does not replace the digest. It signs the digest and binds it to an identity. Verification asks whether this exact image was signed by the identity your policy accepts.
Step 01

Key technical ideas

Hashes answer what, not who

If two people build two images, each image has a digest. Pulling by digest protects you from tag movement, but it does not say whether the digest was produced by your release workflow, a laptop, or an attacker with push access. Signatures add an identity claim over that digest.

Keyless signing avoids secret key babysitting

Traditional signing requires storing and rotating a private key. Cosign keyless signing asks an OIDC provider, such as GitLab, to issue a short-lived identity certificate. The signature can then be verified against the certificate subject and issuer. There is still trust, but not a long-lived key sitting in CI like a loaded mousetrap.

Transparency logs make quiet rewrites harder

Rekor records signing events in an append-only log. That means signatures can be audited after the fact, and suspicious duplicate or unexpected signatures are visible. A transparency log does not prevent every attack. It changes the attack from silent to observable, which is often the difference between incident and mystery.

Attestations are signed statements about the artifact

A signature says an identity signed a digest. An attestation says something more: this build used this workflow, this SBOM belongs to the image, these materials were inputs. Tools can verify attestations separately from signatures. That is how supply-chain policy grows beyond "was it signed?" into "was it built the way we require?"

Keyless sign and verify
cosign sign registry.gitlab.com/YOUR_GITLAB_USERNAME/beacon@sha256:YOUR_DIGEST

cosign verify   --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://gitlab.com/YOUR_GITLAB_USERNAME/beacon//.*'   --certificate-oidc-issuer https://gitlab.com   registry.gitlab.com/YOUR_GITLAB_USERNAME/beacon@sha256:YOUR_DIGEST

For this course, sign from a GitLab CI job with an ID token. A local interactive signature has a different identity, so the verification policy must match the signer.

Integrity, identity, provenance

QuestionMechanismExample

What bytes?

Digest

sha256:abc...

Signed by whom?

Cosign signature

GitLab OIDC identity

Logged where?

Rekor

Transparency entry

Built how?

Attestation

SLSA provenance

Technical terms used at work

  • Cosign — Sigstore's tool for signing and verifying container images and related artifacts.

  • OIDC — OpenID Connect, used here to obtain a short-lived signing identity.

  • Rekor — Sigstore's transparency log for signatures and attestations.

  • Attestation — A signed statement about an artifact, such as provenance or SBOM linkage.